Answer:

I believe it is correct. Why? Because we Filipinos are known for a hard-headed citizens. If one told us not to go out because it's dangerous, what do we do? We break the rules and do what we want. Even wearing a face mask or face shield is against our will. I'm not saying that all of Filipinos are like this but most of us are. So I believe that fighting Covid-10 in the Philippines has become complicated because of Filipino attitude issue.

Explanation:

It's just for my own opinion lang po. No hate just love

The Philippines’ COVID-19 Response: Securitising the Pandemic and Disciplining the Pasaway

Abstract

The Philippine response to COVID-19 has been described as being one of the longest and strictest lockdowns in the world. Why has the Philippine government relied heavily on draconian measures in its “war” against COVID-19? And what discourse informed the framing of its response as a war against the virus? This article argues that the government’s reliance on draconian measures was a consequence of securitising COVID-19, appreciating the virus as an “existential threat.” The securitisation of COVID-19 was reinforced with a narrative characterising the situation of the country as being at war against an “unseen enemy.” This war-like narrative, however, invariably produced a subject, the pasaway. As the perpetual enemy of health and order, the pasaway became the target of disciplining and policing. The targeting of the pasaway was informed by deep-seated class prejudices and Duterte’s authoritarian tendencies.

Keywords Philippines, COVID-19, securitisation, Duterte, populism, policing

It was the third week of April 2020, five weeks since Metro Manila and other provinces were put under “enhanced community quarantine” (ECQ). Under ECQ, school and university classes were suspended, mass gatherings were prohibited, government offices were run with a skeletal workforce, businesses were closed except for those providing essential goods and services, mass transportation was restricted, and people were ordered to observe social distancing measures and to stay at home. At that time, the Philippines had 6,456 coronavirus disease (COVID-19) confirmed cases, 426 deaths, and 612 recoveries. Quarantine rules specified that only one person was authorised to go out and buy essential goods for the rest of their family. As the designated “authorised person outside of residence” (APOR), I was given a “quarantine pass,” a document issued by the barangay. With my quarantine pass securely kept in my bag, I went out to buy food and medicine in a nearby market. Without any public transportation, I walked for nearly thirty minutes to get to the market. The street leading to the market was relatively empty. Apart from people who were, like me, walking towards the market, very few vehicles plied the road. Occasionally, an ambulance would pass by as well as illegal motorcycle taxis. As I neared the market, I saw slow-moving vehicles occupying the street. It was as if I had gone back to the “old normal.” Soon I saw police vehicles. I also saw several buses where people were being loaded. I thought the buses were there to transport frontline workers. I was later told that the buses were there to transport people apprehended for violating quarantine guidelines. My brief encounter with the government’s campaign to apprehend violators of quarantine guidelines is hardly an aberration. Elsewhere in the greater Metro Manila area, the joint forces of the police and the military cracked down on erring individuals.

Explanation:

Abstract

The Philippine response to COVID-19 has been described as being one of the longest and strictest lockdowns in the world. Why has the Philippine government relied heavily on draconian measures in its “war” against COVID-19? And what discourse informed the framing of its response as a war against the virus? This article argues that the government’s reliance on draconian measures was a consequence of securitising COVID-19, appreciating the virus as an “existential threat.” The securitisation of COVID-19 was reinforced with a narrative characterising the situation of the country as being at war against an “unseen enemy.” This war-like narrative, however, invariably produced a subject, the pasaway. As the perpetual enemy of health and order, the pasaway became the target of disciplining and policing. The targeting of the pasaway was informed by deep-seated class prejudices and Duterte’s authoritarian tendencies.

keys: Philippines, COVID-19, securitisation, Duterte, populism, policing

It was the third week of April 2020, five weeks since Metro Manila and other provinces were put under “enhanced community quarantine” (ECQ). Under ECQ, school and university classes were suspended, mass gatherings were prohibited, government offices were run with a skeletal workforce, businesses were closed except for those providing essential goods and services, mass transportation was restricted, and people were ordered to observe social distancing measures and to stay at home. At that time, the Philippines had 6,456 coronavirus.